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Welcome to this joint meeting. I'm Barry Kozak
from The John Marshall Law School. I'm the
director of our elder law curriculum and the chair
of the Section on Aging and the Law. At the last
meeting, my colleague, William LaPiana, who
represents the Trusts and Estates Section,
approached me and said, "You know, maybe it's
time for these two sections to have a joint
discussion." We think that what we came up with
will be interesting, at least to those of us who are at
the front of the room.
The idea started with the conflicts of interest
between estate planning documents and elder law
documents. Elder law attorneys are worried about
people spending their money on quality of life
while they are alive. Estate planning attorneys
focus on transferring wealth through gifts during
life and upon death. There are more conflicts of
interest than you might think.
Then, we started talking about it, and we thought
about the pedagogy: some students may only take
a trusts and estates class, and some students may
[Vol. 117:4
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only take an elder law class. The idea that started
this panel is how could we, as instructors in either
elder law or estate planning, or some of us who do
both, understand the different conflicts of interest
and better prepare our students when they go out in
the world and become estate planning attorneys or
elder law attorneys.
So, we have three panels today and three
moderators. The first panel will discuss mental
capacity conflicts of interest. The second panel
will look at conflicts of interest of family members
who are also beneficiaries of the documents, and
the third panel will highlight some trust protection
clauses. Questions should be asked in the final
minutes of each respective panel.
Let me introduce Susan Cancelosi, who will
moderate the first panel. Susan is currently the
chair of the Employee Benefits Section, and, as of
12:15 p.m. today, the Chair of the Section on
Aging. Professor Cancelosi teaches at Wayne
State. Susan, why don't you make your
introductions.
II. FIRST PANEL: PEDAGOGY ON CAPACITY ISSUES
SUSAN Thank you. My introduction will be incredibly
CANCELOSI: quick because I don't want to take time away from
(Co-Moderator) our really wonderful substance. We have three
people on this starting panel: Katherine Pearson
from Penn State Dickinson, Bob Whitman from
University of Connecticut, and Michael Perlin from
New York Law School.
We're going to hear each of the speakers for about
ten minutes and then stop with five minutes at the
end before our next panel. I've read their articles,
and they are delightful and fascinating.
2013]
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A. Avoiding Undue Influence
KATHERINE Thank you very much, Susan. I'm going to get
PEARSON: right into my topic. The working title of my
(Panelist) current research is Avoiding Undue Influence by
Recognizing Dementia and Impaired Decisional
Capacity, and our subtitle is In the Legal Trenches.
My colleagues, who are here in spirit, are Ann
Kolanowski, the director of the Hartford Center of
Geriatric Nursing Excellence at Penn State
University, and one of our former Penn State
colleagues who is now at the University of
Alabama, Rita Jablonski.
A number of years ago, the three of us began
working together because we saw that, in both the
medical and legal professions, there are obvious
concerns about decisional capacity. We wondered
whether there was overlap or some type of a
dividing line between our approaches.
We collaborated by inviting the law side into the
medical school and nursing school, and inviting the
medical professionals, particularly people from the
Geriatric Center of Nursing Excellence, into the
law school to discuss issues of mental capacity,
specifically dementia. The medical professionals
have shared with us testing tools they use in
assessing decisional capacity. For example, the
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tools for
Clinical Research and Treatment are often
recommended because they evaluate four key
components: the ability to understand disclosed
information; the ability to appreciate the
information as it is applied to oneself, the ability to
use the information to reason; and the ability to
express a choice or preference. We contrasted the
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tools with
guidelines offered by the American Bar
Association in cooperation with the American
Psychological Association. For example, the ABA
offers online a set of guidelines and a sample
[Vol. 117:4
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"capacity worksheet" for lawyers to use to organize
and document their assessment.1
One of the things I have started doing when
teaching elder law classes is to invite a medical
professional to speak about the several forms of
dementia that may affect older adults, including
Parkinson's type of dementia, or frontotemporal
lobe dementia, sometimes called Pick's Disease.
Frontotemporal lobe dementia is a particularly
complicated form of dementia because the
symptoms can begin to manifest quite early in life,
sometimes in the person's 50s, and not be
recognized as a form of dementia. It often involves
impaired judgment, so the people will often do
things that others find strange without anyone
perceiving that this could be part of a larger mental
capacity issue.
When the students hear about these different types
of dementias, sometimes the response is, "This is
all fascinating, but what does it mean to me as a
lawyer?" So, what we do is take that to the next
step and say, "Okay, what does it mean to
understand mental capacity either as a medical
professional or as an attorney, and why might our
views conflict?"
As a teaching tool, we use a 20-minute version of a
short film called Last Will and Embezzlement. The
documentary is also available in a longer form and
both the short and long versions are interesting and
2
provocative.
The documentary features Mickey Rooney and the
dramatic, and very sad, story about his family. The
documentary also presents the story of Pamela
Glasner's father who had advanced dementia and
was residing in a care facility. An attorney and
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
other people visited him in the care facility and had
him sign transactional documents that transferred
money and property. The question for our students
was, "How could this possibly happen?" We use
the documentary to set up a provocative discussion
about what it means to have decisional incapacity
and how lawyers may be witting or unwitting
parties to financial abuse.
We also talk about the different roles of lawyers,
including long-time trusted family lawyers, single
instance transactional lawyers, or as professionals
with special expertise in wills and trusts or elder
law. The next stage of our class conversation is
talking about whether, and to what extent, lawyers
pause to evaluate capacity. I think the answer (as a
practical matter) is very rarely, although I hope the
"elder law" classes are helping change that pattern.
Unless someone suggests to the lawyer that an
individual lacks capacity, lawyers are unlikely to
test capacity. Even when there is a question, the
lawyers may rely on the famous "moment of
lucidity." In one case involving a challenge to a
real estate transfer, the trial judge upheld the
transaction, noting that, even though the signer
may have appeared perfectly coherent one minute
and two minutes later appeared confused, the
signing of the key document occurred while the
individual was "coherent or in a lucid interval."3
The lawyer may wait to think about capacity until
after a challenge is raised. If the next day, or
month, or year, somebody says the person was
incapacitated, well, then the attorney expresses the
viewpoint that, while the person was sitting in the
law office, that person had capacity. As lawyers,
we express confidence in our untested observations
about capacity, and we document our opinions
3. Farnum v. Silvano, 540 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (overturning the
trial court's finding of capacity, despite conceding that actions "during a lucid interval
can be a basis for executing a will").
[Vol. 117:4
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carefully as the transactional lawyer. My concern
is that lawyers receive adequate education on how
to assess capacity. My concern is that we may
spend too much time educating them on how to
document their opinion, however formed.
Rather than pretend that it is an easy decision to
make, one of the challenges I raise with my
students is, "Is it that easy or not?" I present
students with a "hypothetical" that we can later
reveal is not hypothetical at all. As an example, I
describe a gentleman who is in his 80s and who
had a very high profile professional career. He had
an opportunity to do an advance estate plan
perhaps ten years before the date in question, and,
at that time, made the decision to do several estate
planning transactions but to create only a power of
attorney in favor of his wife and not in favor of
anyone else in the family.
As time progressed, the individual's powers
diminished somewhat, and everybody recognized
that. Eventually, the wife said, "I really feel that
perhaps we ought to have a power of attorney for
our children," and she executed one in favor of her
children so that the children would be agents. But
she asked "What about my husband? What if I
predecease him? I'm the only agent named.
Shouldn't we have him do a power of attorney for
our children as well?"
The problem was that, by this time, the person had
fairly advanced dementia, and he had chosen not to
execute a power of attorney naming children as
agents earlier in his life. He had the opportunity,
and he didn't sign the power of attorney that made
any child an agent. And ask the law students, "If
you're the attorney whom the wife consults and
you know that history, what do you do? What's
the reality of that?"
Then, of course, for the law students, I add a little
extra color to the story because, in this instance, the
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
individual was a federal judge. I disclose that in
fact, the individual is my father, and I'm the oldest
daughter. And I'm the one who knows he can still
sign his name, and my mother also noticed that he
can sign his name still and that he trusts people
enough to sign documents offered to him. We
know we have only the right motivations to ask
him to sign a new power of attorney, but should we
do so if we really know in our heart of hearts that
he lacks true capacity?
I ask the students to consider whether the scenario
is different if it is your parent. Is it different if you
are the lawyer representing that client with the
history? Is it different if you know nothing about
that history, but you are in the presence of an older
gentleman who, in fact, will sign his name in front
of a notary who comes to your office? Is it an easy
decision or not?
Using simple power of attorney exercises, and
asking the students to compare their potential roles
as attorneys depending on their knowledge of the
individual's background, are useful exercises.
I'm actually going to stop now because I want to
make sure that we have plenty of time for our other
speakers, and also I want to thank everybody who
worked with our team at Penn State Dickinson
School of Law because we're very pleased with the
cooperation we're getting from everybody.
As you ask questions, please identify yourself
because we would like to include you in the
transcript that will be part of this symposium issue
of the Penn State Law Review.
[Vol. 117:4
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B. Proposing a Unitary Standard for Capacity Determinations
BOB WHITMAN: Good Morning. I'll try to keep this short. My
(Panelist) paper concentrates on the legal rules. I am not, as
our last speaker, going to talk about the possibility
of using psychiatrists and psychologists. I believe
that the determination is to be made by the lawyer
using the legal rules.
The lawyer is not the judge of capacity. The
lawyer knows that ultimately a court or a jury will
actually make the determination. Thus, in a
doubtful case, I believe that the lawyer has to
proceed taking careful notes and so forth.
I've tried it the other way. At one time, I took a
client to a psychiatrist, and she insisted that I come
into the room and so forth. From a practical point
of view, it doesn't work at all. It chews up an
enormous amount of time, and it can get you into
more difficulty than you want.
The rules, as I say, are paramount. Therefore, I
start out from a practice point of view because
much of what I have learned and taught is through
practice with the concept of the package. The
client comes in, and the client wants a will, a trust,
revocable or irrevocable, a health care power, a
durable power of attorney, and a living will.
Now, we probably all know that the will has the
least amount of requirement of capacity unlike, for
instance, capacity of the contract which some of
these others have. My article traces the historical
development of each of the standards of capacity
for each of the items in the package. Not
surprisingly, standards come from Roman law,
from early English common law, and they vary, but
only slightly.
In my own practice, I never thought that I could
divide the items in the package and say to a client,
"Well, we can do a will because that's a lower
2013]
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standard, but we can't do a trust because that's a
higher standard of capacity."
Somewhat recently, I took an informal survey of
members of ACTEC, the American College of
Trusts and Estates Counsel, asking if anybody
would break up the package in terms of capacity.
Nobody would break up the package, and that's
very important because we have a set of legal rules
that do not reflect the actual goings-on in practice.
For that reason, I have been thinking that my
article is a tribute to Lord Mansfield and Karl
Llewellyn because they believed that, in order to
have just law, you've got to find out what's being
done, and then you've got to create the law to
reflect that because of the changing times.
I advocate a unitary standard applicable to
transferring assets, gifting, execution of the durable
power of attorney, creating a health care power,
creating a revocable or irrevocable trust, or
creating a will. The standard is the following:
does the individual understand the property to be
dealt with, the natural objects of the bounty, and
how the acts to be done will affect the client, and
whether the intent of the client will be carried out?
I think this unitary standard would advance us a
great deal and make it much simpler for law
students to understand. Then, if they want to
choose the other route and go to the psychiatrist or
the psychologist, I have to warn them that, in
practice, that's not going to work out in a practical
kind of way. Thank you very much.
C. Seeking International Standards for Mental Disability
Guardianships
MICHAEL My article is going to be somewhat different from
PERLIN: both of the ones you've heard already, and I expect
(Panelist) all of the ones you're to be hearing afterwards.
[Vol. 117:4
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The title is "Striking for the Guardians and
Protectors of the Mind": The Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the
Future of Guardianship Law.
My friends in the audience will know where that
quote comes from. For those of you who are not
my friends yet, it's from Bob Dylan's song,
Chimes Of Freedom, which I heard live most
recently at the Barclays Center.
I'm going to talk about the international human
right implications of guardianship proceedings, and
I have to say my mind has been pinballing listening
to what was said in the first two talks. As for my
background, I am not part of this group at all. My
background is in criminal procedure and mental
disabilities law, and there's been so much written
in those areas about whether there can be a unitary
standard.
This whole notion of moment of lucidity, which is
rejected on the criminal side 100 percent, is not
what I'm talking about either.
In most nations of the world, certainly in virtually
every civil law nation, the entry of a guardianship
order is the civil death of the person who is
affected. They're stripped of all their legal
capacity in everything having to do with finance
and property, but also stripped of their rights to
vote, to give consent to medical treatment, to
marry, and to have a family.
Guardianship is used very frequently in other
places. There are about 80,000 people under
guardianship in Hungary4 and at least 300,000 in
4. Istvhn Hoffman & Gybrgy Knczei, Legal Regulations Relating to the Passive
and Active Legal Capacity of Persons with Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities in
Light of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Impending
Reform of the Hungarian Civil Code, 33 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 143, 166 n. 171
(2010).
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Russia.5 Consider now the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD),6 which,
ignominiously, our Senate failed to ratify last
month by several votes, although this will come up
again and hopefully will be ratified.
The CRPD is the most important international
human rights document ever drafted on behalf of
this population, and it speaks to guardianship
instead of paternalistic guardianship laws that
substitute the guardian's decision over the decision
of the individual . The CRPD model is one of
supported decision-making.8
Here's the issue. What impact, if any, will the
CRPD and other international human rights law
documents have on guardianship practice around
the world and in the United States? In the article, I
look at why guardianship is considered civil death.
I also look at domestic law, the CRPD, and then I
raise some red flags that have to be confronted in
this inquiry.
How do we know that the lawyers assigned to
represent individuals subject to guardianship are
going to be doing an adequate job? To what extent
are domestic judges going to take this seriously,
and what happens in those parts of the world, like
Asia and the Pacific, where there is no regional
human rights tribunal that litigants can go to9 as
they can in Europe and, to a lesser extent, in Africa
and South and Central America? °
5. See Russian Constitutional Court Criticises "Abusive" Guardianship Law,
MENTAL DISABILITY ADV. CTR. (June 28, 2012), available at http://bit.ly/10xc3mY.
6. See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS
ENABLE, http://bit.ly/6ylrm (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
7. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Social Change in Asia and the Pacific:
The Need for a Disability Rights Tribunal to Give Life to the UN Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 44 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 22 (2012).
8. See Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision
Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title H of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157, 161 (2010).
9. See Perlin, supra note 7.
10. See generally MICHEAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD (2011).
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I'm going to be writing about all of these issues in
my article. As I have said already, guardianship is
seen as a kind of civil death, especially, but not
exclusively, when people are institutionalized.
Institutional abuse is rampant in these cases. And,
with the exception of a few courageous lawyers
working for an NGO in Budapest and elsewhere in
Eastern Europe," I the Mental Disability Advocacy
Center, nobody seems to care very much.
The U.N. Secretary General has issued a report
excoriating the way this guardianship is done in
other parts of the world. It's terribly wrong. There
have been some cases. A case called Stanev v.
Bulgaria,12 a tremendous case, saying that the way
guardianship is done violates different sections of
the European Convention on Human Rights.
In the story about Stanev, somebody comes to his
home and takes him to an institution for adults with
mental disorders. The transfer is made by his
guardian, whom he had never met, and the
guardian "hands him off' to the director of the
institution. Stanev was never told about this. No
one said how long he was going to be there.
Ten years later, the lawyers of the Mental
Disability Advocacy Center went to court and were
successful in obtaining a monetary judgment (as if
money really mattered at this point).
We're not talking solely about Bulgaria or central
and eastern Europe. There are examples from
China, Guana, Mexico, all over.13 This violates
11. See MENTAL DISABILITY ADV. CTR., www.mdac.info (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
12. Stanev v. Bulgaria, App. No. 36760/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), available at
http://bit.ly/Typ5zW.
13. See, e.g., Ghana: People With Mental Disabilities Face Serious Abuse, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Oct. 2, 2012), http://bit.ly/SzzC8w (citing example from Ghana); Roger
Bill, Plenary Guardianship: Persons with Disabilities Made Vulnerable, MCGILL BLOGS
(July 10, 2012, 4:10 PM), http://bit.ly/ lgni5q (citing example from Mexico); CHINESE
HUM. RTS. DEFENDERS, THE DARKEST CORNERS: ABUSES OF INVOLUNTARY PSYCHIATRIC
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international human rights law. It violates due
process. It violates basic human dignity.
What about the United States? Well, at best,
guardianship provides personal care and property
management that an individual with a disability
can't handle alone. At worse, it deprives him of
decision-making authority for which he does have
capacity. It used to be historically an all-or-
nothing test.14 That's changed, on paper at least.
There are procedural protections in most
jurisdictions. In reform statutes, there are rights to
notice, counsel, and due process hearings, and the
presumption is that guardianships should be limited
rather than plenary. In addition, there are now
divisions between guardianship of property and
guardianship of the person. Many current statutes
make this clear.15 There is a huge gap between law
on the book and law in action, and that's something
that needs to be addressed.
Courts have to tailor guardianship orders to afford
the incapacitated individual the maximum amount
of independence possible, and the guardianship
should be given powers only in specific, limited
areas where the individual requires assistance.
The CRPD rejects the medical model, instead
adopting the human rights social model. That has
to force us in both the United States and every
other nation to reconceptualize the notion of
guardianship provisions.
COMMITMENT IN CHINA 12 (2012), available at http://bit.ly/YBkK23 (citing example
from China).
14. See, e.g., BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS
247 (3d ed. 1997).
15. See, e.g., Debra H. Kroll, To Care or Not to Care: The Ultimate Decision for
Adult Caregivers in a Rapidly Aging Society, 21 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 403,
435-36 (2012).
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Leslie Salzman has written about this1 6 and about
how current guardianship laws in the United States
very often violate the Americans with Disabilities
Act. I think Leslie's work is spot on.
The most important domestic case to consider these
issues is the New York State case of In Re Mark
C.H.17 Judge Glen, who is in the audience, wrote
on why the CRPD found that guardianship
appointments need to be subject to the
requirements of periodic recording and review, and
why Article 12 of the Convention needs to be
followed to prevent these kinds of abuses. 1
8
Access to supported decision-making is now the
preferred norm by international treaty. As I was
putting my computer together on Friday to get to
the airport, what is the last thing I see on my
Westlaw feed? A case that Judge Glen decided on
December 31, 2012.
What a way to celebrate a new year and a
retirement. In In re Guardianship of Dameris L.,
Judge Glen talks about how section 17A of the
New York guardianship statute is constitutionally
suspect because of international human rights. 19
Unfortunately, not too many of Judge Glen's
colleagues in New York or in any other state have
been following this line.
I said that there are some red flags. There are four.
I'm just going to name them now because I have
received my three-minute warning.
One, the need for dedicated counsel, and those of
you who heard me speak before have heard me
harp on this extensively.20  Two, the need for
16. See, e.g., Salzman, supra note 8.
17. In reMark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2010).
18. Id. at433.
19. In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2012).
20. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your
Funeral, My Trial": A Global Perspective on the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment
2013] 1001
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alternative non-institutional guardians because, in
many places, the guardian-the institution-
becomes a de facto guardian, and that is just
wrong. Number three, the question of whether
domestic courts will actually take this seriously.
And, number four, what I alluded to before, is that
we need to consider the case of Asia and the
Pacific where there is no regional tribunal.
In my article, I spent quite a bit of time talking
about therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) as something
to look at. This portion of the paper discusses the
need to use the voice, the need for voluntariness,
21
and I think that is so important in the guardianship
process.
But I don't think anyone has yet looked at
guardianship/international human rights/TJ all at
the same time. The guardianship literature teaches
us that a TJ approach promotes autonomy and is
likely to improve the quality of life for the person
under guardianship. It seems to me the IHR
literature tells us that TJ-this is the way Bruce
Winick wrote about this, God rest his soul-will
help the general state of human rights.22
In this article, Bruce was talking about Hungary
and Bulgaria, but the issues go far beyond those
two nations. I think the CRPD-and I said this to
Professor Amy Ronner before this Joint Meeting
began-reflects a certain principle that you
articulated: how does law actually impact a
person's life? I think that, if we look at the
guardianship process, these reforms are entirely
prompted with TJ and with procedural justice
Cases, and Its Implications for Clinical Legal Education, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & SOC'L
POL'Y 241 (2008).
21. See, e.g., Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal
Education and Therapeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO
L. REV. 601, 627 (2008).
22. Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Treatment of People with
Mental Illness in Eastern Europe: Construing International Human Rights Law, 21
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 537, 572 (2002).
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values by privileging voices, autonomy, and
participation. I think that, if we do that, we will
meaningfully bring the CRPD's mandates to our
citizens under this system.
International human rights law has the capacity to
restructure guardianship law around the world. It's
not going to have any real life values unless there
are lawyers willing to do it and judges like Judge
Glen willing to enforce the law.
The mandates of international human rights law
scream out for a universal overhaul of guardianship
law in practice, and I hope that my talk today and
the article in the Penn State Law Review makes
some of us think about this more. Thank you.
I'll start with a question. I guess this is more for
Michael Perlin. I appreciate everything you said,
and I'm agreeing with you, but specifically in
American elder law, if the court gets involved and
there's guardianship, then it's an official
guardianship proceeding. Do you see any way to
filter that down, not to a formal guardianship
adjudicated by a judge, but to where a physician
may step in and declare that someone is
incapacitated? That is, could you have a type of
voluntary durable power of attorney that says, "If
the physician steps in and says that Dad is
incapacitated, then the children take over." (I tell
all my students in elder law class that the loving
happy families are out there, we just don't read
about them in court cases.)
That's a great question. Also, you're right about
unhappy families certainly. I've not thought about
that idea before, but, as you said it, what came to
my mind was a Supreme Court decision from 1992
in the case of Zinermon v. Burch,23 finding that,
even if somebody appears to be voluntarily entered
into a psychiatric hospital, there has to be some
23. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
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kind of due process mechanism to make sure that
24the voluntariness is truly voluntary.
The plaintiff in Zinermon is found wandering down
a highway in Florida. He goes to the hospital.
They ask him to sign the papers. He says, "Oh,
don't tell me. I'm signing myself into heaven!"
That was the heart of the case.
And I am wondering in terms of a durable power of
attorney if a person is in danger of losing certain
property rights-no one is being locked up, so it's
certainly different for Winnebago County25 or
Youngberg26 purposes-but I am wondering
whether there should be some kind of a third-party
judicial consideration. Not necessarily a full
adversarial hearing, but something.
This is a great question. I've given it zero thought,
so this is clearly on the fly, which a teacher should
never do, but I'm doing it, obviously, and I think
that is possibly a new reform to suggest.
In Illinois (and it's done in all 50 states, certainly),
the durable power of attorney statute was amended
in 2010, and it now gives the court jurisdiction to
look at the fiduciary duties of different agents that
take power of attorney. And, as Bob Whitman
said, whether it's on the books or not, who knows
what they're doing in practice, but at least it's on
the books.
I'd like to mention the idea of a fiduciary
accounting, which is used where there is some
question of duties. It doesn't have to be all that
formal, but it does bring out issues, and those can
be brought before a court. Fiduciary accountings
in Connecticut are used for that purpose.
24. See Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 407, 428 (2000).
25. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
26. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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I notice that we have several people in the audience
with hands raised.
Hi, Laura Rothstein from University of Louisville.
My question is, due process is important, but what
about the transaction cost? If it is burdensome, you
start consuming assets. Is there a process that isn't
expensive so that you're not giving up assets?
What Professor Laura Rothstein asked is what
about the expense in our effort to provide due
process: are you in danger of dissipating the estate.
I think that's a serious and important question.
One of the issues is to what extent counsel should
be provided, to what extent are the rights that a
person could lose here sufficiently significant that,
in fact, they would have a right to counsel. And
there have been all sorts of recommendations in the
last several years about the need for a "civil
Gideon," and this might be another area where this
might come into play.
It's clearly an issue. And, like Barry Kozak said,
you only read about unhappy cases. You also only
hear about.the rich cases, and there's much more
than that, but I believe it can be done more simply,
and I believe-even though I'm always skeptical
about mediation in cases of economic imbalance-
that when it comes to people with modest
resources, there may be ways of doing this to make
it a bit more cost effective.
Again, I certainly have not thought that part out.
These are very important issues, but I think we
might want to expand who should be included-
that is, the universe of people to whom some kind
of legal aid is made available.
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I'm a recently mandatorily retired surrogate of
New York County and future professor at City
University of New York Law School, and I just
wanted to call your attention to something that
might be under the radar for you which is kind of
paradoxical. At least in New York, guardianship is
now being used primarily-this is in New York
County-to do pre-mortem planning.
Oftentimes, it's the one child who thinks the other
child has the power of attorney and is transferring
the parent's property to himself or herself. So
we're moving toward a more restrictive
intervention in these interfamily disputes about
where the money is going to go in a way that I
don't think guardianship-putting aside all other
issues-was ever intended for, but it has now
become the weapon of choice in these situations.
The durable power of attorney is also subject to
attack after the grantor's death through a discovery
and turnover proceeding in which a disgruntled
heir has another chance to set it-and any transfers
made pursuant to it-aside.
My name is Karen Boxx. I'm from the University
of Washington at Seattle. My question is that it
sounds like you're applying the rules of
international human rights to the appointment
process. I think there has been some attention on
the guardianship reform in the United States in that
respect, but my question is: have you thought
about applying those principles to the guardian as
appointed because then you fall off a cliff, and the
courts aren't supervising, and that's where the real
harm happens, after appointment.
That's in the part of the paper I didn't present to
the audience. I have thought about that. I think it's
terribly important. The case that I mentioned, the
Mark C.H. case,27 which Judge Glen decided about
27. In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2010).
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three years ago, talked about a similar situation,
and both Leslie Salzman's article28 and an article
by Henry Dlugacz and Christopher Wimmer
recently 29 talked about that extensively. So yeah,
that's also being discussed. Thank you very much.
That brings us to time on our first panel. Thank
you everyone.






That was a fascinating start to the program. We're
going to shift gears now. We're now assuming
someone has mental capacity and is doing the
planning, and we're going to consider conflicts of
interest within the family. Specifically, conflicts
with family members who are both beneficiaries
under the will and agents under the durable power
of attorney.
I'm going to introduce Nina Kohn. The speakers'
academic papers are a little more in detail, but
today it's going to be more of a discussion about
how do we as professors teach these different
concepts in our estate planning classes and in our
elder law classes.
Nina Kohn is a professor at Syracuse University
School of Law, and she will introduce her panel.
We have three great panelists today. We have
Lenore Davis who has a private estate practice that
covers New York and New Jersey. We have
Richard Kaplan, who is the Peer and Sarah
Pedersen Professor of Law at the University of
Illinois, and we're going to round it out with Mary
28. See Salzman, supra note 8.
29. Henry Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with
Limited Competency in Guardianship Proceedings, 4 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL"Y
3312 (2011).
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Radford, who is the Marjorie Fine Knowles
Professor of Law at Georgia State and the president
of the American College of Trust and Estate
Counsel (ACTEC).
A. Important Issues in Estate Planning: A Practitioner's Perspective
LENORE DAVIS: Thank you. I think the area we're discussing now
(Panelist) is encapsulated by Veruca Salt in Willy Wonka and
the Chocolate Factory: "Daddy, I want an Oompa-
Loopma, and I want it now." After 20 years of
practicing trust and estates and elder law, I thought
it was time to go back for an LL.M. in tax, and
Professor LaPiana invited me to join the LL.M. tax
program at New York Law School. He was also
my faculty advisor.
So I handed my nine kids and the keys to the
minivan to my husband, and I said, "Catch you in
three years." After three years was over, as I was
completing the LL.M. in tax, Professor LaPiana
approached me and we discussed my teaching
estate planning for the LL.M. We spent extensive
amounts of time discussing how we wanted the
estate planning class to come together, and we were
in agreement that it should be a very practical class.
What we came up with was a request to the IT
department to set up a wiki program. Instead of
giving fish to the students, of course, we would
teach the students how to fish.
We set up these wikis, and we assigned to each
student a basic trust and estate document. The end
story and part of the midterm was to not only
research it, comment on it, and upload it to the
wiki, but to comment on all the other students' wiki
documents to see how each student would improve
the other student wiki documents.
The core purpose was to provide those who wanted
to enter the area of trust and estates to have in hand
15 to 20 documents as his/her starter forms library.
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In recent years, my practice had experienced a
surge in intra-family conflict/abuse cases. Two
summers ago, as I was teaching my first semester,
two such cases burst onto the popular scene.
One was Celeste Holm's case,3° and the other one
was the Brooke Astor case. 31 And, again, in a
summer semester, you go from 14 weeks to 7
weeks, and that happened in about the fifth week.
Although it was week 5 out of a 7-week semester, I
determined that there was great practical
pedagogical value in reviewing the issues set forth
in these cases, with an eye in determining how best
to avoid them via estate drafting tools, and how
best to deal with these issues as the conflicts arise.
As the significance of these issues became clear,
and as the lesson evolved, ultimately the name of
the segment was "Attorney Intervention on Behalf
of Client Grantors Against Trustee Beneficiaries."
Long title, but it says it all.
And, what pedagogical value was there? It was
important. As a trust and estate attorney, I can
easily tell when I look at a will whether the drafter
or attorney does probate work. If it's missing an in
terrorem clause or an affidavit of attesting
witnesses, I suspect that the attorney may not
regularly do probate work because if he did, he
would anticipate the future and issues that might
arise that an in terrorem clause and an affidavit of
attesting witnesses addresses.
So now, we come into a new part of my practice,
which is surging, unfortunately, and it is quite sad.
That is, cases where beneficiaries are turning on
their relatives.
30. See, e.g., John Leland, Love and Inheritance: A Family Feud, N.Y. TIMES (July
2, 2011), http://nyti.ms/15K1TDZ.
31. See Brooke Astor, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2012), http://nyti.ms/1 1faSuH; see also
John Eligon, Settlement in Battle over Astor Estate Is Reached, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28,
2012), http://nyti.ms/HhsjCx.
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And, what pedagogical value was there to the two
cases? Well, how can we avoid conflicts between
grantors and trustee beneficiaries, and the answer is
in the new Power of Attorney rules. I know that
most attorneys hated the New York 2010 updates to
the powers of attorney, but, amongst the changes in
the power of attorney, there was a section for
monitors. And, of course, in trust documents, you
could always appoint monitors or trust protectors.
When discussing with clients who they want as
fiduciary in their trust, we always raise the
question, "Why not a corporate fiduciary?"
(especially if there are millions of dollars at stake).
And, they say, "No, we don't want to pay for a
corporate fiduciary. We don't want to pay the
maintenance."
So, whom do they turn to 99.9 percent of the time?
Their relatives. And, of course, the conversation
goes like this: "You understand, Mrs. Smith, that
the root of the word trust is trust. You know that
the root of the word trustee is trust. Do you trust
these people?" They inevitably say, "With
everything and my whole heart they will never turn
against me." My practice is busy dealing with the
after effects of these famous last words.
One way I teach my students to avoid these
conflicts is to appoint monitors in powers of
attorney and trusts, who are non-beneficiaries, have
business acumen, and optimally are familiar with
the affairs of the client, e.g., her financial planner,
accountant, etc. The other is to appoint as co-
trustee or co-attorney a corporate fiduciary.
I understand-I get the corporate fiduciary
problem. I understand you trust your children with
all your heart. Yet please do me a favor and for
your powers of attorney and for your trust, let's get
monitors. Monitors will not interfere with the daily
running of your trust and with your attorneys, but
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monitors will ensure that there isn't greed, self-
interest, and will have standing to go to court and
raise these issues quickly and efficiently so they
can be easily resolved.
What happens, though, if we don't have monitors
in trusts and we don't have monitors in our powers
of attorney? Well, now attorneys have to intervene.
Thus, we're going to talk about two interventions.
There are mandatory interventions by attorneys,
and there are optional interventions. Let's talk first
about mandatory interventions by attorneys.
We have the model in Rule 1.14 on a client with
diminished capacity.32 We have Restatement Third
of the Law Governing Lawyers, Section 24, about
clients with diminished capacity. 33 We have a case
decided by Judge Glen that I often quote, which is
Cheney v. Wells,34 and it's a fantastic road map for
when attorneys can withdraw as counsel and how
they have to ensure that there's a guardian or
replacement for themselves if they're in the middle
of litigation.
Let's talk about when it's mandatory. If you are in
the middle of representing a client, it is mandatory
that you not leave them high and dry. That means,
if you want to settle the case, it has to be settled,
unless you go to court and have a guardian
appointed. The attorney may not settle the case on
behalf of a client with diminished capacity.
On the optional side, you've got the question of
"show me the money." If you want to take on the
case that is not mandatory to take on, you're doing
it for the money. So you are hired by one of the
family members or by some uninterested party for a
guardianship proceeding, and you have to let them
know that there's no guarantee that the court will
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14.
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 (2000).
34. Cheney v. Wells. 877 N.Y.S.2d 605 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2010).
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require the alleged incapacitated person's estate
pay for your representation.
You also must let them know, as in the Brooke
Astor case, that just because Brooke Astor's
grandson, Philip Marshall, loved his grandmother
and started the guardianship petition and wanted to
be appointed guardian, there's no guarantee that the
guardianship will be granted and that the petitioner
would automatically become said guardian.
What happened in the Brooke Astor case is they
decided there was no abuse by Anthony Marshall
of his mother, but once the family got the
authorities involved, it was stepped up to a criminal
case. Not only did they criminally indict Anthony
Marshall, the son, they indicted Frank Morrisey, his
attorney, and the case was elevated to fraud. So,
that guardianship was what brought the matter to
light. That guardianship went to the wayside, and
now both Mr. Marshall and Mr. Morrisey are
looking at possible jail time.
Finally, when determining what is in your client's
best interest, whether you should intervene in these
kinds of matters, let me ask you a question, I say to
my students, "If you were doing this on behalf of a
client, let's ask the final questions. Would Mrs.
Astor have wanted her 85-year-old son placed in
jail? Would Mrs. Astor have wanted $20 million-
which represents greater than 10 percent of her
estate-used for legal fees?"
So we end with Hippocrates who said, "First, do no
harm." And that's where I leave you.
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B. Important Questions of Conflict of Interest
RICHARD Good morning. I presume everyone has a copy of
KAPLAN: the handout. There are extra copies if you do not
(Panelist) have one. Today, I will focus on the conflicts of
interest in some common arrangements as seen in
trusts and estates law versus elder law.
The first page of the handout 5 has the title
"Financial Surrogate," and the situation is a
teaching hypothetical adapted from an article that
appeared in Virginia Lawyer.3 6 It's a fairly simple
diagram. The son and father are previous clients.
They have had wills done, but now the father
supposedly needs some assistance with bill
paying. The son has come to you and asks for
your assistance in creating a joint bank account
between him and his father.
A joint bank account is one of three typical
financial surrogacy arrangements. It's actually the
least expensive and the most rudimentary. The
other financial surrogacy arrangements are the
durable power of attorney for property and the
"living" or revocable trust.
The most common financial surrogacy
arrangement is an adult child simply becoming a
joint bank account owner and holder, and that's
what the son is proposing here. From an elder law
standpoint, this is a very cost-effective means of
enabling the father to stay current on his bills, and
for the son to take over his father's financial
affairs more generally.
From a trusts and estates perspective, however, if,
as is typically the case, the son has a sibling (in
this case, a sister who is a co-legatee of the
father), and if the father's will leaves half to each
35. See infra Exhibit 1.
36. John E. Donaldson, Ethical Considerations in Advising and Representing the
Elderly, VA. LAW., Mar. 1991, at 14 (situation #1).
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of them, the potential exists for the testamentary
plans of the father to be countermanded. That is,
the son can drain the account and thereby
disinherit his sister.
This is the basic conflict of interest. The Model
Rules indicate that you can represent a person in
this situation, 7 but you need to have disclosure.38
Under Model Rule 1.7, this disclosure must be
made in writing, but to whom is the disclosure
made, and will it make much of a difference?
39
At this point, the discussion must begin with what
Professor Barry Kozak said, which is, "Why are
we assuming that this is necessarily an evil son?"
That question brings up a virtual checklist of what
you might want to know about the son to
determine whether you are comfortable with this
arrangement. The son might be a loving and
attentive person who is not going to take
advantage of this situation. On the other hand, the
son will be empowered to drain the account before
his sister can do anything about it, so the question
is: "What's the likelihood of his doing so?"
This problem leads us to a detailed fact inquiry.
Does the son have a drug problem, or is he
chemically dependent in other ways? Is he
addicted to gambling, or maybe has business
losses? Perhaps the son is behind on his own
student loans and needs cash. Or in a more
positive vein, the son might have his own children
who are now of college age and they need money
to go to college. Under any of these scenarios, the
son might think to himself, "All I'm doing is
accelerating my inheritance to when I actually
need the money." As you can see, a variety of
financial stresses might cause the son to want to
drain the account.
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1).
38. Id. R. 1.7(b)(4).
39. See id. cmt. 20.
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The contrary proposition, of course, is that no
such financial stresses may exist, and we
shouldn't presume that the son will drain the
account. Nevertheless, when this situation is
considered in class discussions, students often
conclude that there is just too much power to place
in the hands of the son.
So the question then becomes, "How can you
solve the problem that the client came in with-
namely, that the father needs some assistance with
financial affairs?" The son is saying, "I am here,
ready and able to step up to the plate. If you don't
like my arrangement, what do you suggest?" That
is, simply saying that the joint bank account
should not be done is not an adequate response to
the father's predicament.
One approach is to ask yourself, "What exactly
concerns you about the joint bank account?" The
answer is, of course, that the son will drain the
account. In that case, one response might be to
reduce the account balance. That is, older people
oftentimes have large amounts of cash in their
bank account, often much more than their
foreseeable needs. In fact, the amount may even
exceed the FDIC limit (currently $250,000), and
in the lowest-yielding available investment to
boot.
This might be an appropriate occasion to take
some of that money out of the bank account, move
it into certificates of deposit, U.S. Treasury bills,
or some other investment to reduce the exposure
of the father to having the son drain the account.
The son will still be able to pay the bills, and,
while the potential remains of his draining this
account, we have at least minimized the potential
harm.
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However, this approach may not be acceptable to
the son, in which case we have more reason to be
suspicious of the son's motivations for the joint
bank account. However, if the concern is that the
bank account is too large and poses too much of a
temptation, then perhaps the solution is lowering
the amount in the account.
After a certain amount of prodding, students often
conceive of an even better solution. Virtually all
of the students have automatic payment
arrangements for their utility bills. So, we can ask
the son, "Exactly what kinds of bills are you
worried about the father missing payments on?"
They are typically the critical sorts of utilities:
water, electricity, perhaps cable. All of these
services can be arranged with automatic debits,
leaving the bank account's ownership undisturbed
and thereby avoiding any potential problem with
the will.
To be sure, this approach won't take care of Home
Shopping Network, which you can't set up as an
automatic debit, but I'm just not too worried about
that particular obligation. If we're worried about
the heat being turned off, or the power being cut
off, then the solution might be to have automatic
debits-in combination or as an alternative to-
reducing the amount of the account. This way,
critical bills are paid without possibly
compromising the father's testamentary plans.
On the other side of the handout, you'll see a
different hypothetical.40 This situation involves a
mother who is living with your client, named
Betsy. Mom previously lived with Betsy's older
sister, Ann, before Ann died and left one
grandchild.
40. See infra Exhibit 2 (adapted by the author from John E. Donaldson, Ethical
Considerations in Advising and Representing the Elderly, VA. LAW., Mar. 1991, at 14
(situation #4)).
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We're assuming that Mom has plenty of capacity
and sufficient assets as well. Mom could probably
live on her own, at least in an assisted living
facility or a retirement community, but she wants
to live with family. She expressed that desire
previously by living with Ann, and she has now
lived with Betsy for a while.
Betsy is fine with this arrangement, but, as
everyone knows, having an older person in your
household is, shall we say, a mixed blessing.
There are restrictions on what can be served for
dinner and when parties can be held. And, in any
case, Betsy has four kids, and Ann had only the
one child.
The will is per stirpes, which is typical of that
generation, meaning that half of Mom's assets will
go to each of the sisters' sides. Since Betsy has
four kids, she has now asked the attorney to
change just one word in the will: where it says
"stirpes," put in "capita." Just one little change.
How much can that hurt?
Well, as you can see, if this will is per stirpes,
then Ann's child is going to receive 50 percent
while Betsy's four children will split the other 50
percent. If you change the will to per capita,
Betsy's family in toto will basically go from
receiving 50 percent to receiving 80 percent of the
estate.
From a trusts and estates standpoint, this scenario
raises the issue of undue influence. Mom is living
in Betsy's home at this moment. Even if you were
not otherwise conflicted, there's a high probability
that this will is going to be invalidated if
challenged, so what are we really accomplishing
by changing the distribution pattern?
A typical student response to this situation is to
refer Betsy to an unconflicted attorney for
purposes of changing Mom's will. That attorney
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will undoubtedly interview Mom, and will ask the
question, "Why do you want to change your will?"
Mom might then say, "Well, I really don't want
to. This is the will that my deceased husband and
I created. We have two children. Everything goes
per stirpes to each side of the family." (She may
not use the phrase "per stirpes," but she will
express the basic idea of an equal distribution.)
Then the attorney says, "Where are you living
now?" Mom's response then is, "I'm living with
Betsy. She brings this up during every dinner.
I'm getting tired of it. I just want to have it done."
Now the previously unconflicted attorney may
feel that, even though she's had no prior
relationship, she does not want to participate in
this will revision because there could be a
challenge on the basis of undue influence.
In other words, there is no guarantee that referring
Mom to another attorney will lead to a changed
will. The only certainty is that referring the matter
to another attorney will give Betsy the sense that
you're abandoning her. And she may decide to
take her other business elsewhere in the future.
Nevertheless, from an elder law standpoint, Betsy
is providing an important and genuine benefit to
Mom. Betsy is an unpaid family caregiver
providing care that is undoubtedly more reliable
than what is available from paid caregivers, and is
enabling Mom to avoid moving into an institution.
Indeed, what if you were to ask Betsy, "Exactly
what is your problem?" She might reply, "Well,
I'm living with this older woman; there's a lot of
stress. I am working my butt off."
You respond, "Did you say 'working?' Do you
want to be compensated?" Her response: "Yes, I
think that I should be paid. I've earned it."
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This response leads us to consider whether a
family caregiver agreement is appropriate here, an
issue that I discuss in a Virginia Tax Review
article.41  A family caregiver agreement is a
contract between the family caregiver and the care
recipient, and is not intended to be overreaching or
unfair to anyone. We can make some quick calls
to local paid caregivers and get an hourly rate, and
that would be the amount used for the contract.
There will be income tax implications for Betsy
from the family caregiver agreement,4 2 but if her
concern is that she is not being paid for her
considerable efforts and inconvenience, we have
now solved that problem. Family care agreements
are often used in the Medicaid context,43 but they
are an increasing phenomenon, even in Canada
where there is no Medicaid issue.
44
Nevertheless, if the concept of paying a family
member to provide care is abhorrent, then an
alternative might be to make a series of inter vivos
gifts. Inter vivos gifts are not restricted by the
will. Mom could give an equal amount to each of
the five grandchildren, which would basically
accomplish what Betsy wanted to begin with.
To be sure, such gifts will probably not constitute
the entire amount that is in Mom's estate, but this
approach leaves the will undisturbed and avoids
the undue influence issues that revising the will
would implicate. Incidentally, and this feature
might appeal especially to Mom, a program of
annual gifts provides an incentive to Betsy to
make sure that Mom is alive and well so that she
can continue to make such gifts, while changing
the will is an approach that creates a financial
41. Richard L. Kaplan, Federal Tax Policy and Family-Provided Care for Older
Adults, 25 VA. TAX REv. 509, 526-34 (2005).
42. Id. at 528.
43. Id. at 533-34.
44. See generally Richard L. Kaplan, Formalizing the Informal: Family Care
Agreements in Canada and the United States, 1 CANADIAN J. ELDER L. 52 (2008).
2013] 1019
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
NINA KOHN:
(Co-Moderator)
incentive for Mom's early demise. Thank you
very much.
Now we have our third panelist, Mary Radford.
C. Important Family Concerns: In What Capacity Do We Represent
You?
Thank you. I'm just going to follow up on Lenore
Davis's and Richard Kaplan's theme. That is,
how we can teach our students about the conflicts
that will arise between family members, both in
elder law (where we're concerned with "lifetime
planning"), and trusts and estates (where we're
concerned with "death time planning").
I often find that I have students in my elder law
classes who haven't taken trusts and estates yet or
may not ever take it, and vice versa. Therefore, I
try, particularly in my elder law class, to bring up
hypotheticals that will cause them to understand
that, if you only know about elder law, you may
not help a client make the right decisions. And if
you're only focusing on estate planning, you also
may not help a client make the right decisions.
The case study that I use is inspired by the facts of
a true case from Georgia.45  It involved an
individual who married for the second time, we'll
call her Judy, and she married the brother of her
first husband, James. James, of course, had been
married before and had two children.
(As I always explain to my students, the synonym
for "stepmother" is "litigation." I think that's one
of the few things the students actually remember
that I ever taught them because they will come
back constantly and remind me of that.)
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James already had a will leaving everything to his
two children, Kim and Lee. Judy gets a little
worried and says, "You know, your brother didn't
do that well. He didn't leave me very much, and
I'm a little worried about what is going to happen
to me when you die." And James says, "Don't
worry, we'll take care of this right now," and
James sets up the ubiquitous joint bank account in
his name and Judy's name for $500,000. Judy
puts $5,000 into it. Now everything seems fine.
Unfortunately, James becomes incapacitated, and
his daughter, Kim (who, by the way, is the
beneficiary under his will), becomes his guardian.
The elder law attorney representing the guardian,
Kim, tells Kim that she is to marshal all of her
father's assets. That includes, of course, closing
any joint bank accounts and bringing any assets in
those joint accounts that belong to him back into
his sole ownership.
Kim is not guilty in this case. Kim has been told
by her elder law attorney that this is what
guardians do. On the other hand, what's happened
is that the guardian, Kim, has unwittingly
completely destroyed a very important component
of the estate plan of James.
A good estate-planning attorney, of course, would
never recommend the joint bank account as a way
to approach this problem with James and Judy.
But as we've been talking about and alluding to in
several situations today, the efficiency and the
ease of a joint bank account unfortunately makes
that the "estate plan" of a lot of people.
Now, James had obviously enough money. He
should have hired an attorney, but, of course, he
needed the money and did not want to spend it on
something so frivolous as an attorney to help him.
So what happens now? Well, in the case, when
James died, the money belonged to him. Judy
came in and said, "There was an estate plan in
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place," and the court said, "Where's your proof?"
I then think with my students, when you're in a
situation like this, what do you do? The first
question is, "Whom do you represent?" Often, as
we well know, there is a conflict between
husbands and wives, and I fear most estate
planning attorneys don't think about that enough
when the couple comes in together and says, "We
would like you to represent us." The students and
I have a long discussion on the concept of joint
representation and when it's appropriate. In fact,
if any of you need a good teaching tool on this
issue, ACTEC has written commentary to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and they're
available on the ACTEC website.46 They have a
great description of when you should engage in
separate representation, and when you should
engage in joint representation.
Let's take the matter further for our attorneys-to-
be, our students. Kim has now come to you.
You've been representing James, and perhaps
Judy. Now you represent Kim. Unfortunately,
that happens quickly. Attorneys tend to fall into
this mode of being the family lawyer, so I try to
alert my students to the fact that every time you
take on a new member of the family-or even any
time you take on a new engagement in the
family-you have to think of it as a new matter.
(Of course, I always suggest a new engagement
letter, and I hope we will be training a crop of
attorneys who will be having engagement letters
in their files. But I think if all of us who have
been around for some time were to poll our friends
of our same age group, we would find engagement
letters are not commonly used.) Therefore, that
sparks the discussion of the new engagement, and
the potential for conflict of interest.
46. See AM. COLL. OF TRUST & ESTATE COUNSEL, http://www.actec.org (last visited
Mar. 18, 2013).
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Then I take James and Judy, and I change the
hypothetical completely. I say, okay, James lives
for another ten years; then he dies. The bank
account is still in place, and Judy gets her
$500,000. His estate is worth about $3 million.
Judy is the executor under his will. (Now the
students start to laugh because they understand
that maybe there could be a conflict when the
stepmother is the executor.) Judy is deciding
whether to take her elective share. That brings up,
of course, a whole range of philosophical
questions as to whether the elective share should
reflect what would have been James' wishes-
whether James, in fact, should have given her
more than the $500,000.
The key issue now for my students is that Judy is a
fiduciary because she is an executor. Her job is to
fulfill the wishes of her husband, the decedent, but
she's also in a position as an individual that may
cause her to want to override his estate plan by
taking her elective share. So we talk about how
people will unwittingly end up in these innocent
but difficult situations. It's not the case of
somebody pilfering daddy's money, but the client
has fallen into this situation partially because the
client hasn't been guided well by the client's
attorney.
The question I then ask is, "If you represented
James and you perhaps represented James and
Judy jointly, and you know what James' wishes
were, what do you do when Judy comes to you
after his death and says that she wants you to
represent her?" The first question for the lawyer
should be, "In what capacity do you want me to
represent you?" In other words, "Do you want me
to represent you as the executor of James' estate,
or as an individual who is potentially a beneficiary
of his estate?"
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If Judy says she wants you to represent her as both
the fiduciary and as an individual, then we try to
analyze if the attorney can do that. Lastly, can
Judy, as a fiduciary, come in and shatter this estate
plan? Of course, it's legal for her to ask for her
elective share. This brings up a very important
issue that I think all of us struggle with in our
classroom: at what point do you move beyond the
Model Rules, beyond professional responsibility,
into moral questions relating to your clients?
What is your job as an attorney when those moral
issues come up?
I want to keep us on time, so I'm going to leave
you with all those questions.
NINA KOHN: I think we have about two or three minutes for
(Co-Moderator) questions.
JOSHUA TATE: Hi, I'm Josh Tate from Southern Methodist
(Audience University. I have a question for Lenore, and it
Participant) relates to your comment that if you see a will
without a "no contest" clause, you know that it
wasn't written by an estate planner.
Of course, there are a number of situations where
the "no contest" clause won't work. In some
states, including mine, if a contest is brought in
good faith and for just cause (or probable cause),
it doesn't work. Obviously, if the contest is
successful, it doesn't work. Moreover, if you
don't leave enough money to the person that it's
directed against and they don't care about it, then
it doesn't work.
What I'm wondering is, say you have a situation
where the testator is young enough and has kids
that are young enough that the kids have not yet
completely disappointed, and there's no conflict at
this point. If you put a "no contest" clause in, and
you explain what it is supposed to do, is there any
danger that it might lull the client into a false
sense of security?
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The question is, "Does placing an in terrorem
clause in a will provide false hopes for the client
in thinking that his will is objection-proof?"
My answer to you is that, regardless of what
jurisdiction you're from, I think an in terrorem
clause should be placed in as the first line of
defense. As I mentioned, in New York and New
Jersey, which are neighbors, there are very
different views on in terrorem clauses. In New
York, there's strong support for an in terrorem
clause, but that's not the case in New Jersey.47
Yet you also have to understand that many
children will not hire their own attorneys to find
out how strong an in terrorem clause is. They'll
look at this clause and they'll say, "Oh, if I object,
I'm going to lose it all. I don't even want to risk
losing it all." I don't know how strong it's going
to be or how strong it is, but just looking at it can
be a deterrent for children or beneficiaries.
One more question.
Hi, I'm from Florida A&M College of Law, and I
have a question about the per stirpesiper capita
issue. It becomes more interesting if Ann is the
one who is the client who's coming in wanting to
get the will changed because she has one child and
Betsy has four children. If Ann is the one who
survived after Betsy provided the care first, would
you recommend that same option of gifting more
to the one grandchild versus the other four?
47. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:2A-32 (West 2013); see also Haynes v. First Nat'l Bank of
N.J., 432 A.2d 809 (N.J. 1981).
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RICHARD That is an interesting but different hypothetical.
KAPLAN: The situation that I set up is the more natural
(Panelist) pattern; that is, the younger child is the survivor.
But as a pedagogical matter, after students feel
that they have resolved my issue, you could
certainly change the pattern and ask whether their
analysis would be different in the reverse
situation.
By the way, on the undue influence point
respecting gifting, there is a lower burden, and
there is also less of a paper trail with inter vivos
gifts than with testamentary dispositions. If the
short-changed donees question the amount of their
gifts, the donor is still alive-unlike the situation
with testamentary transfers-and might explain,
for example, that "well, I'm giving this amount
because this is what I want to do," or "these are
Christmas presents," or "I'm just following the
advice of the estate planning attorneys I see
quoted in the Wall Street Journal every day."
Barry had talked about the ACTEC commentary
sample Model Rules for examples and pedagogy.
If you find yourself teaching an elder law course
and you're not immersed in some of these issues,
there's also the National Academy of Elder Law
Attorneys, NAELA.org, and they have something
called aspirational standards.48 They look at the
Model Rules, not as extensively as ACTEC does,
but they consider how to apply the Model Rules in
the elder law context. If you find yourself
teaching some elder law issues in your estate
planning class, feel free to look at them and you'll
get some good examples.
48. NAT'L ACAD. OF ELDER LAW ATF'Ys, ASPIRATIONAL STANDARDS FOR THE
PRACTICE OF ELDER LAW WITH COMMENTARIES (2005), available at http://bit.ly/XndZ4P.
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Now we're moving to the final panel where I'll
introduce Bill LaPiana, and he'll introduce the one
speaker on this panel. Bill and I put this program
on together, even though I'm moderating. He
represents the Trusts and Estates Section, and he is
the Rita and Joseph Solomon Professor of Wills,
Trusts and Estates, and the Director of the Estate
Planning Graduate Tax Program at New York
Law School.
It is my great pleasure to introduce Larry Frolik of
the University of Pittsburgh. There's a lovely
symmetry to this in that I started out as a law
professor at the University of Pittsburgh. Larry
was my colleague, something I appreciate
enormously, and it just seems very right to be able
to introduce him to talk about trust protectors, an
issue of enormous and growing importance.
Thank you.
I want to talk about trust protectors because trusts
are becoming increasingly interesting. Trusts and
trust protectors are more important than ever for
several reasons. In particular, in elder law classes,
I'm reconsidering how much time I devote to
trusts because I have to teach trusts now in that
course. I can't assume that they will have had a
course in trusts and estates.
Why are trusts so important these days? First, the
irrevocable trust that was popular in the old days
is dying. It's almost impossible now to create a
trust that is truly irrevocable. That tide's going
out relatively fast.
The irrevocable trust is going because society is
more and more willing to overturn a settlor's
wishes as expressed in a trust. If you're new to
the field, it doesn't seem that important.
However, if you look over the last 40 or 50 years
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of case law, you will see a tremendous change in
irrevocable trusts. That change has led to the
concept of having someone down the line in the
years to come who can act on behalf of the testator
or the settlor to modify that trust so you don't
have to go to court.
The second reason, which is fascinating, is the
growth of the use of trusts not just to avoid
probate. The use of trusts has exploded in the last
few years.
The reasons we're seeing trusts being used so
much are the following: the fear that large family
assets will be lost to divorce, lack of confidence in
the abilities of heirs to manage money, and the
potential for disability and/or dementia of a
surviving spouse or child. It's also a recognition
that guardianship is a failure of private planning;
there's no reason for your client to ever need
guardianship because you can better manage
property by the use of a trust. As far as health
care personal decisions are concerned, you can do
that through the appointment of a surrogate
decision-maker. And, of course, there's the fact
that no one in their right mind would ever sign a
power of attorney to control many assets. It's
good for managing a small bank account to pay
the bills, but it's certainly not something you want
to deal with very valuable financial assets. If you
have significant financial assets, you create a trust.
It could be a revocable trust, but you certainly
don't leave large assets sitting out there to fall into
a power of attorney for all the reasons that have
been explained earlier.
I think we're going to see that, as people age,
they're increasingly going to transfer assets into
an inter vivos trust as a standard practice. They're
also going to leave their assets to their offspring,
decedents, and spouses in trusts so that they can
protect those assets.
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Once you have these trusts, the question becomes,
"How do I know down the line that the trust will
do what I want?" Because, as has been pointed
out, most trusts eventually have corporate trustees
or family trustees that you don't have a lot of
confidence in.
I think it would be irresponsible for any lawyer
not to tell their client that they cannot depend on
family members as trustees. Family members are
not to be left alone with large amounts of money.
They don't know how to invest it, how to manage
it, or how to distribute it over long periods of time.
Moreover, it creates family conflict leading to all
the problems we've seen in the cases discussed
today. Again, I can't imagine any lawyer who
wouldn't advocate at least a joint corporate
trustee. Having said that, I also have limited
confidence in corporate trustees. The corporate
trustee is the guy who went to business school,
ended up in the trust department, and now he is
managing trust funds. He likely doesn't know
how to invest money any better than many
individual trustees.
A solution is the trust protector. The concept is,
"Who's watching the trustee?" It can be a trust
protector. The trust protector is someone who can
oversee the trustee. And this is also why it is
relevant in elder law, because we know elder law
is now increasingly picking up on the special
needs trust concept as a way of protecting heirs in
their later years when they may suffer a loss of
capacity.
The idea is to create a special needs trust for
disabled beneficiaries or a trust designed to protect
the surviving spouse if she becomes demented and
can't watch out for her own financial interests.
The trust paradigm assumes that a beneficiary will
watch out for himself or herself. It assumes that
the beneficiary is the watch bird watching the
trustee. And, if the beneficiary doesn't like what
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the trustee is doing, the beneficiary can resort to
the courts and say, "I don't think they're doing
right by me."
What happens when your beneficiary is
incapacitated? Now, they can't do it. They can't
watch out for themselves, and that's when trouble
arises. And so people in the special needs world
have come up with a concept of the protector, but
I think it's going to flow right back into other
trusts for surviving spouses and offspring who
may become disabled down the line or who have
financial problems.
The first concept of a protector is the ability to
replace the corporate trustee with another
corporate trustee. That's an elemental power
someone has to have, otherwise you're stuck with
the bank, and you can't do anything with them.
They don't care about you and your complaints.
But if they can be removed, you'd be surprised
how soon they will answer your phone calls. So
that's the first thing.
The other problem you worry about is, "Does the
trust meet future eligibility requirements for
governmental benefits?" That's why special
needs trust planners are so worried. They are
worried that the trust set up today, which currently
lets my beneficiary qualify for Medicaid and other
governmental programs, may not qualify 30 or 40
years from now. We may need to change that
trust.
You can always go to court. Any trust can be
modified, but it's much simpler if you were to
have a trust protector empowered with the right to
modify the trust as needed to carry out the intent
of the settlor in light of changes in federal law.
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You can also have the trust protector be, as it
were, the monitor of the lifestyle of the
beneficiary. Someone watching to make sure that
the trust is distributing enough funds and in the
right form to keep the lifestyle of the beneficiary
at an appropriate level.
There are other powers you can give to trust
protectors, but these are the ones I think are going
to become very commonplace in the future. If
you're teaching trusts and estates and you're not
talking about protectors, you're not preparing the
students for the world to come. And teaching
elder law is similar. I think we need to get our
students alerted to these protector issues.
There are also some fascinating questions. The
first one, of course, "Is a protector a fiduciary?"
There are those who argue it shouldn't be. From
my standpoint, of course you'd want them to be a
fiduciary and hold them to a very high standard,
otherwise you get into difficult questions of what
is their standard of care.
The second question, "Is this a proactive or a
reactive position?" Does the protector have an
obligation to take steps to protect the beneficiary
or is the trust protector merely empowered to take
steps if it thinks something should be done? But if
is there is an obligation to act, who enforces it?
Do we need a protector to watch the protector?
Probably not. But the point is, "Can a protector be
in trouble if she doesn't take affirmative steps to
protect the beneficiary, and, if so, what standards
would you judge her by?"
The third question is, "In what document do you
appoint the protector?" I've seen people say,
"Name the protector outside of the trust in a
separate document." I don't like that. Can you
actually create a separate document that permits
the replacement of the trustee? I'm not sure. You
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probably can, but it is an interesting question.
How much language are you going to put in the
trust about what the protector can do and what
kinds of standards they're held to? And then, of
course, who replaces the protector? Because
you're probably not appointing a corporate
protector. The protector is likely to be an
individual. You may not want Cousin Harry to be
the trustee, but you do think that he can at least
carry out the duties of a protector. But what if
Harry dies, becomes incapacitated, or just tires of
being a protector? How is his replacement
determined?
These are just some of the uncertain aspects of
trust protectors. Then you have the question, "If
you have a power of attorney for other assets, do
you want the protector to be able to replace the
agent under the power of attorney for the same
reason you would allow them to replace the
trustee under the trust?" And how does a
protector relate to your surrogate health care
decision-maker (the person who can sign your
client into the assisted living, for example)? That
may look like a health care decision, but it is a
huge financial commitment. What if the protector
thinks that is not in the best interest of the
principal? Should the protector be expected to
monitor the actions of the surrogate health care
decision maker?
If not, you're really letting the surrogate call the
shots on how the principal's money is going to be
spent. Perhaps the protector should be
empowered to replace the surrogate or at least
monitor the surrogate, or be empowered to go to
court and ask the court to do it.
And should a protector be monitoring a guardian?
Despite the best efforts and desire to avoid the use
of trusts and the appointment of agents, a court
may decide to appoint a guardian.
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What's the relationship of the guardian to the
protector? Is the guardian going to be able to
come in and remove your protector or interfere
with the protector?
I think there are many interesting questions to be
considered as we start developing protector law.
And, as I have said, I think in a trusts and estates
course, it should be part of what you cover. It
doesn't take long to explain that the settlor should
sign a trust at the bottom and then move on to
other interesting subjects, such as trust protectors.
And, in elder law, we may have to pull back from
spending so much time on all the interest of
Medicaid planning and start talking more about
trusts and trust protectors.
My time is up. I want to thank the organizers for
this opportunity to talk to you about protectors.
I think we have time for one or more questions for
Larry.
Hi, I'm from the Santa Clara University School of
Law. I'm interested in the trust protector, and I do
teach it, but who do you name as a trust protector?
That's always the big question for me. Can you
name yourself as the lawyer?
As I suggested, family members can be named
trust protectors; but what if there aren't family
members, or none that you'd want to name as a
protector? There are lawyers who are now
offering themselves. They are willing to be
protectors. You get into enormous conflicts,
obviously, if you are the lawyer who drew up the
trust. So that is probably not a good idea.
But I think we're going to have people begin to
offer themselves as professional protectors. We
see it in the guardianship world already, and we're
going to see it more in the protector world.
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Absent that, I think the alternative would be doing
reciprocal appointments with other estate planners
in town. It's not a conflict, but it's a comfortable
arrangement.
Larry, for some time, lawyers in Florida would not
take on protector status because they saw it as an
invitation to litigation, and I think it is a problem
now.
It's also an invitation to a paycheck.
Well, that's right. But it is a problem.
No. You're right.
As Larry said, this is maybe not the traditional
way of doing estate planning and elder law
planning, but as Medicaid planning is being
restricted, and as there is more litigation in trusts
and estates, maybe that's the future.
We're also seeing guardianship services now,
which are similar to the small organizations that
used to function solely in the area of indigent
services. They're now doing a fee scale basis for
this type of work. Some of them have begun to
take on modest estates, and that allows it to be
more affordable for everyone.
Thank you to both the Section on Aging and Law
and the Section on Trusts and Estates.
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You have previously prepared wills for both Dad and Son. Dad is
having difficulty remembering to pay bills, and Son wants to become
Dad's financial surrogate, preferably through a joint checking account.
Dad's will divides his estate equally between Son and Daughter.49
Question: What would you do?
1. Disclosure of conflicts and client confidentiality.
2. Suitability of son as a financial surrogate.
3. Possible impact on father's testamentary plans.
4. Alternative strategies (bank account reduction; automated
bill-paying)
49. This hypothetical is adapted from John E. Donaldson, Ethical Considerations in
Advising and Representing the Elderly, VA. LAW., Mar. 1991, at 14 (situation #1).
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EXHIBIT 2




GC-1 GC-2 GC-3 GC-4 GC-5
Betsy and her husband are long-time clients. Betsy's mother
recently moved into Betsy's home after living with her other daughter,
Anne, until Anne passed away. Mom has ample financial resources and
is just as sharp as ever. The will that Mom and her late husband prepared
leaves everything to their grandchildren per stirpes. Betsy wants you to
persuade Mom to change her will's distribution pattern to per capita.5 °
Question: What do you recommend?
1. Effect of undue influence on validity of will.
2. Referral to another attorney.
3. Family caregiver agreement.
4. Inter vivos gifting.
50. This hypothetical is adapted from John E. Donaldson, Ethical Considerations in
Advising and Representing the Elderly, VA. LAW., Mar. 1991, at 14 (situation # 4).
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